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REPEAL OF THE TULLOCH RULE:
IS THE TIDE OF WETLAND REGULATION RECEDING?
J. RICHARD CHEEKS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") authorizes the
United States Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for the
"discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites."' While the CWA provides exceptions to this
general permitting requirement, these exceptions are not available for
activities that bring the waters into a new, non-wetland use.2 In the
1970s, the Corps promulgated regulations that generally tracked the
statutory language.3
In 1986, the Corps modified the regulatory definition of
"discharge of dredged material" to include "any addition of dredged
material into the waters of the United States" with an express de
minimis exclusion of any soil movement that occurs incidental to the
"normal dredging" process.4 In explaining the 1986 rulemaking, the
Corps clearly stated that its purpose was to regulate the discharge of
dredged material, not the dredging process. 5 In this regard, the Corps
observed that "[d]redging operations cannot be performed without some
fallback," and the regulation of this incidental fallback would constitute
a regulation of the dredging process, a result that the Corps concluded
was beyond the intent of Congress.6  The 1986 regulations
distinguished "sidecasting" from incidental fallback and regulated the
*Senior Staff Member, Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law; J.D., 2000
University of Kentucky.
'Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1999).
2See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2). The subject of this paper is excavation and drainage of
wetlands. These activities produce a new use for the land.
3See National Mining Ass'n. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399,
1402 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 37145 (July 19, 1977)).
4Id. at 1401(citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41232 (1986)).
5See id. at 1402.
6 See 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41210 (1986). (The Corps was responding to specific
comments that the fallback and other soil movement incidental to normal dredging operations
should be a regulated discharge. In explaining it final rulemaking decision, the Corps points out
that the fallback is incidental to dredging operation and de minimis when compared to the overall
quantities removed. The test of regulation suggested by the Corps was the dredger's intent. If
the intent is to remove material from the water and the results support this intent, then the activity
is a normal dredging operation and is not subject to regulation.
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former because sidecasting "involves placing removed soil in a wetland
... at some distance from the point of removal."
7
In 1993, the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency
again modified the regulatory definition of "discharge of dredged
material" under the CWA's § 404 Regulatory Program. This
modification was promulgated in response to the settlement of a
lawsuit9 in which the Corps and EPA agreed that "mechanized
landclearing, ditching, channelization, and other excavation activities"
would degrade the waters of the United States if they occurred within
wetlands. I° This modification became known as the Tulloch Rule.
The Tulloch Rule eliminated the de minimis exception and
brought incidental fallback within the definition of "discharge of
dredged material" even though the incidental fallback occurs,
essentially, at the same spot as its removal. Under this formulation, the
Tulloch Rule subjected virtually all dredging and excavation operations
to federal regulation under § 404 of the CWA when the dredging
changes the character or nature of the wetland." While the Tulloch
Rule eliminated the de minimis exception, the Rule left open a possible
exclusion for any incidental deposition of dredged material that did not
"have the effect of destroying or degrading an area of waters of the
United States." 12 However, the dredge operator had the burden of
proving that the operations would not have a negative effect, a
threshold the Corp regarded as very low. 3 When the Tulloch Rule was
adopted, the White House prophetically called upon the Congress to
amend the CWA in accordance with the rule.' 4 The rising tide of
wetland regulation now covered all the land.
In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held, in response to a facial challenge by industry, that the
7National Mining Ass n., 145 F.3d at 1402 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 45008,45013 (1993),
noting that sidecasting has always been regulated under § 404.)
858 Fed. Reg. 45008 (1993). Hereinafter in the text of this paper, references to the
Corps are intended to include both agencies.9 See North Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Tulloch, Civil No. C90-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C.
1992). ) 0 National Mining Ass'n, 145 F.3d at 1403.
11See id. at 1401.
12Id. at 1402-03 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(3)(i)).
13See id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(3)(i); 56 Fed. Reg. 45020) (1993).
14
See id. at 1410 (citing WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,




Tulloch Rule exceeded the Corps' statutory authority. 5 The D.C.
Circuit affirmed the district court decision and declared the Tulloch
Rule unlawful.' 6 To avoid a "flood of duplicative litigation,"' 7 the court
refused to apply the injunctive relief only for the complainant and its
members and reinstated the district court's national injunction. The
court urged the proponents of the Tulloch Rule to encourage Congress
to amend the CWA as the White House had candidly urged. 8
This paper examines the rising tide of legislative,
administrative, and judicial regulation of wetlands that produced the
Tulloch Rule, the effect of the Rule's regulatory high water mark on
construction in wetland areas, and the impact of the Rule's demise.
II. LEGISLATIVE RULEMAKING AND
JUDICIAL HISTORY
A. Statutory Authority for Regulation of Dredging, Excavation and
Filling
Congress has given the Corps the authority to regulate dredging
and filling activities that impact the waters of the United States
primarily through two statutes: the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
("RHA") and the Clean Water Act of 1972.9 The RHA "regulates
'navigable waters of the United States' and prohibits 'work' (e.g.,
dredging and filling) or the placement of structures in such waters
except in accordance with a permit issued by the U. S. Army Corps of
Engineers. 20 In contrast, the CWA regulates the "discharge of 'any
pollutant."' 21 This is defined as "any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source. '22 The Corps derive their
"5See National Mining Ass'n, 145 F.3d at 1408.
16See id. at 1409-10.
171d. at 1409.
"See id.
9 See id. at 1401-02. (citing Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403, as requiring a
permit under § 10 for any dredging operations that occur within the waters of the United States.
The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, requires a permit for discharge of dredged or fill material
into the waters of the United States).
20Mark A. Chertok, Federal Regulation of Wetlands, SD88 ALI-ABA 855, 858 (June
21, 1999) (citing the RHA).21 Jan Goldman-Carter, Activities Regulated UnderSection 404 of the Clean WaterAct
and the Farm Bill "Swampbuster" Provision, SA83 ALI-ABA 87 (May 29, 1996).221d.
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authority to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill material as a
pollutant from § 404 of the act.23
1. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899
The RHA requires a permit for activities, including construction,
dredging, and filling, that may obstruct travel on navigable waters.
These waters are defined as those waters that are, have been, or could
be used for commercial transportation, or wetlands subject to tidal
flows. 24 The RHA thus regulates all waters that have been or may have
been used for interstate or international commerce, as well as waters
affected by the "ebb and flow of the tide." In this regard, at least one
federal district court has held that the RHA applies to the "entire width
of a navigable waterway, to the line of mean high water."
25
This definition of navigable waters allows the Corps to regulate
all construction activities conducted within the coastal wetlands under
the RHA § 10 permitting process. However, much of the nation's
wetlands lie outside this jurisdiction, as most wetlands are isolated and
not located in areas subject to the tidal flows. Therefore, the Corps'
authority to regulate wetland activities under the RHA is limited only
to activities that occur within the tidal areas.
2. Clean Water Act of 1972
Since the Corps already had an established role in regulating
construction of navigable waters under the RHA, Congress delegated
to the Corps the authority to administer the permit program for dredge
and fill permits under § 404 of the CWA.26 Since its enactment in
1972, the § 404 Permit Program has become the "federal government's
primary mechanism to limit development in ... wetlands" by requiring
a permit for any "point source discharges of dredged or fill material into
waters of the United States.
27
23
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1999).
24
See Sharon M. Mattox, Regulatory Obstacles to Development and Redevelopment:
Wetlands and Other Essential Issues, CA47 ALI-ABA 603,607 (October 12, 1995).
25Id. (citing Bayou des Families Dev. Corp. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs.,
541 F. Sup?. 1025, 1034 (E.D.La. 1982)).
See id. at 607.27 1d. The Clean Water Act distinguishes between point and non-point sources of
pollutants entering the nation's waters. Point sources are those pollutant discharges that occur
at a discernible, specific location such as the end of a pipe. Non-point sources contribute the
pollutant to the water body from an area, or activity whose affect can't be specifically located as
[VOL. 15:1
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Discharge of dredged material is the addition of any material
that had been excavated from a water of the United States, including
runoff from a dredged material disposal site.2' Discharge of fill
material covers many activities associated with earth moving that
places (discharges) the fill material into the waters of the United
States.29 Over the years, the definition of discharge of dredged and fill
materials has expanded to include any activities that produce a
regulated discharge into a jurisdictional wetland.a This expanded,
regulatory definition of United States waters for purposes of the CWA
has come to include "all waters whose degradation 'could affect'
interstate commerce.' Compared to the reach of the RHA into
wetlands, the regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA reaches virtually
every poorly drained area, regardless of its size, ownership, or location.
B. Regulation of Wetlands Under § 404 of the Clean Water Act
1. Wetlands
Wetlands are defined within the regulations as areas saturated
by surface or ground water at a frequency, and for a duration sufficient,
to support vegetation that is typically adapted to life in saturated soil.
32
Even after substantial losses of wetlands over the last half-century, the
estimated 105 million acres of wetlands that remain represent
approximately five percent of the total area of the contiguous forty-
eight states. With the inclusion of Alaska, wetlands comprise about
twelve percent of the nation's land area.33 However, approximately 221
million acres of wetlands once existed within the United States, 34 and,
by the middle of the twentieth century, wetland losses averaged about
458,000 acres per year. During the 1970s, the environmental science
community began to publicize the societal and ecological value of
wetlands and the essential functions that wetlands fulfill. For example,
to be administered with a permit program. For example, application of agricultural chemicals can




3°See id. at 609.
31Kelley A. Kinney and Andrea West Wortzel, Environmental Law, 32 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1217, 1254-55 (1998).
32See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b).33See National Mining Ass 'n, 145 F.3d at 1402.
34See Chertok, supra note 20, at 857.
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these groups have suggested that wetlands are important mechanisms
because wetlands: (1) prevent or at least minimize flood events; (2)
purify storm water runoff; (3) provide various wildlife benefits; and (4)
provide critical food sources and habitats for numerous species, many
of which are listed as endangered or threatened and which depend upon
the wetland for their continued survival. 35 They argue that these
wetland values even extend to non-tidal areas.
These claims about the importance of wetlands have driven the
development of regulatory programs designed to reduce the loss of
wetlands.36 As a result, wetland losses declined to an average of
approximately 290,000 acres per year during the 1970s, and, by 1977,
the Corps' regulatory framework had expanded its jurisdictional reach
to include any isolated, inland wetland whose degradation or
destruction could affect interstate commerce.37 Since "almost any spot
of water 'could be' used by birds that cross state lines, virtually all
isolated wetlands became regulable under this standard, no matter how
small or isolated. 3 These efforts extended wetlands protection and
further reduced the average annual wetland loss to about 117,000 ares
between 1985 and 1995. 39
At the same time that these regulatory efforts directed at
wetland protection increased, the amount of non-wetland land suitable
for development has declined. Since seventy-five percent of all
wetlands are privately owned,4" the wetlands have become a
battleground between environmental interests seeking increased
wetland protection and property owners wishing to develop their
property. As such, the owners have challenged the authority of the
regulatory agencies to diminish the owners' ability to develop the land
and have further argued that the regulation is an uncompensated
regulatory taking. These claims have increased the scrutiny of the
regulatory programs by Congress and the court.4'
In 1989, the Fourth Circuit held that jurisdictional claims over
isolated wetlands violated the "notice and comment requirements of the
3 5See id.
36See id.3 7See id.
38Mattox, supra note 24, at 614.
3 9See Chertok, supra note 20, at 857.
4°See National Mining Ass 'n, 145 F.3d at 1402.4 1See id.
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Administrative Procedure Act. ',42  However, the Corps has not
recognized the impact of this decision outside the Fourth Circuit and
continues to regulate isolated wetlands in all other circuits.43 The
Seventh Circuit held in 1993 that the use of these wetlands by
migratory birds was a sufficient link to interstate commerce, allowing
the court to defer to the Corps' inclusion of isolated wetlands within its
jurisdiction. However, the court also held that the Corps must show
that a particular isolated wetland is a suitable migratory bird habitat."
The Seventh Circuit revisited this general question in 1994 when it
refused to extend the CWA's coverage to an artificial pond, warning
that the "extent of federal jurisdiction over isolated waters remains an
unsettled area of the law. '45  In 1997, the Fourth Circuit held that
isolated wetlands were beyond the Corps' statutory authorization
because isolated wetlands comprise "intrastate waters that have nothing
to do with navigable or interstate waters.",46 However, just as the Corps
ignored the Fourth Circuit's earlier Tabbs Lake, Ltd. v. U.S.47 holding,
the Corps has similarly elected to ignore the court's United States v.
Wilson48 holding in all other circuits.49
2. Legislative History of Clean Water Act
Senator Edmund Muskie was a chief sponsor of the CWA.
During Senate debates about amendments to the act, he clearly
expressed an intention that the CWA reach the nation's wetlands.50
42Mattox, supra note 24, at 614. (citing Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F.
Supp. 726, 728 (E.D. Va. 1989).
43See id.
"See id. at 614-15 (stating that after April showers not every temporary wet spot
necessarily becomes subject to government control. Citing Hoffman Homes v. U.S. EPA, 999
F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993), the court warned that nearly all wetlands fall within the jurisdiction of
the CWA since "one test for whether the wetland affects interstate commerce is whether migratory
birds use the wetland ... On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that the ... Corps ... might
completely overextend their authority.")451d. at 615 (citing Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d
962 (7th Cir. 1994)).
46National MiningAss'nv. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1412
n. 2.
4'715 F.Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1989).
4'133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
49See Kinney, supra note 31, at 40-41.
50See Bryan Moore, National Mining Association v. United States Army Corps Of
Engineers: The District Of Columbia Circuit Drains Wetlands Protection From The Clean Water
Act, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 235, 237. According to Senator Muskie, "The unregulated destruction
of [wetlands] is a matter which needs to be corrected and which implementation of section 404
1999-20001
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However, Senator Pete Domenici suggested Congress intended to
restrict the reach of the § 404 program when he made it clear that
Congress did not intend to regulate someone who is moving just a
"little bit of earth." 51 Finally, Senator Ellender said that "[t]he
disposal of dredged material does not involve the introduction of new
pollutants; it merely moves the material from one location to another.
52
However, the Supreme Court chose to disregard these legislative
comments and has instead concluded that Congress made a broad
delegation of authority under the CWA to the Corps to protect the
aquatic ecosystem.
53
3. Expansion of § 404 Jurisdiction Between 1972 and 1993
When the Corps first applied the CWA, it regarded the
jurisdiction over wetlands to be the same as defined by the RHA:
navigable waters, and below mean high water (e.g. tidal wetlands).
Litigation over the years, however, has expanded this jurisdiction to
include all waters of the United States that may affect interstate
commerce.5 Accordingly, rulemaking in 1975 and 1977 expanded the
jurisdiction to include wetlands that are adjacent to other regulated
waters of the United States, as well as wetlands that are isolated, if their
destruction, or degradation could affect interstate or foreign
commerce.
55
4. The Redeposition Doctrine
The expansion of the regulatory reach into wetlands continued
with .the introduction of the Redeposition Doctrine in Avoyelles
Sportsmen 's League, Inc. v. Marsh.56 In this case, the Fifth Circuit held
that "redeposition associated with the landclearing activity constituted
has attempted to achieve." Id.5 1Bradford C. Mank, American Mining Congress v. Army Corps of Engineers:
Ignoring Chevron and the Clean Water Act's Broad Purposes, 25 N. Ky. L. REV. 51, 58 (1997).52 Id.
53See Moore, supra note 50, at 237 (citing U. S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474
U.S. 121, at 132-33 (1985)).54
See Mattox, supra note 24, at 612.
55See id. (citing 40 Fed. Reg, 31321 (July 25, 1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 37122 (July 19,
1977); 33 C.F.R § 328.3(a) (1990) which presents the definition of "waters of the United
States".) 56715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
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regulated discharges under section 404."" In explaining its decision,
the court indicated that a redeposit could reasonably be considered an
addition based on the purpose and legislative history of the CWA. 8 At
the same time, the court did not reach the issue of whether "mere
removal" or "de minimis disturbances" are in fact discharges and
limited its holding to more significant redeposits. 9
In 1985, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Redeposition Doctrine
in United States v. MC.C. of Florida, Inc., 60 which involved bridge
construction in the Florida Keys. The court held that the tugboat
propellers were causing a discharge of dredged spoil by cutting into the
bottom sediments and moving them with uprooted vegetation onto
adjacent sea grass beds. The court considered this redeposition by
analogy to sidecasting,6' which is significant because it provided a
stepping stone to the further expansion of the Corps' regulatory reach,
eventually leading to the Tulloch Rule eight years later.
5. Corps Response to Redeposition Doctrine
Following theAvoyelles decision, the Corps issued Regulatory
Guidance Letters ("RGL") to its personnel regarding the applicability
of § 404 to excavation activities under the Redeposition Doctrine.62 In
RGL 84-04, the Corps made two telling statements about the statutory
limits of their jurisdiction over dredging activities in wetlands and the
de minimis discharge:
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act authorizes [the
Corps] to issue permits for the discharge of dredged or
fill material into the waters of the United States. It
does not authorize the Corps to regulate dredging in
these waters.




60772 F.2d 150 (11 th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987),
readopted in relev. part, 848 F.2d 1133 (11 th Cir. 1988).61See id. at 1506. The use of the term "spoil" instead of "soil" in the preceding
sentence is in recognition that the CWA regulates the discharge of dredged spoil, not soil.62See Craig McKinney Douglas, Partial Deregulation of Excavation and Dredging in
Wetlands After National Mining v. U S. Army Corps of Engineers: Reconsideration of the
Regulatory Boundary, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 469, 491 (Feb. 1999).
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3. De minimis discharge occurring during normal
dredging operation, such as the drippings from a
dragline bucket, is not considered to be a [s]ection 404
discharge.63
These Regulatory Guidance Letters displayed a cautious
approach to the jurisdictional reach issue under the Avoyelles
Redeposition Doctrine. RGL 84-04 closely followed an earlier
pronouncement by the Corps in RGL 84-01 in January of the same year,
in which the Corps concluded that § 404 jurisdiction depended upon the
extent of soil movement caused by the activity. 64 RGL 84-01 was based
on the proposition that "[m]inimal movement of soil, in and of itself,
incidental to removal or planting of vegetation is not subject to
[s]ection 10 [of the RHA], nor is its deposit considered to be a [s]ection
404 discharge."65 Two additional RGLs, RGL 84-05 and RGL 85-04,
fu,'ther described the Avoyelles Redeposition Doctrine and advised
Corps personnel that applicability of § 404 is based on the "overall
intent of the underlying activity rather than solely on the nature of that
activity's associated discharge."66
In the midst of the emergence. of the Redeposition Doctrine,
and on the heels of the RGLs, the Corps engaged in significant
rulemaking that culminated in 1986.67 When the 1986 rule was
adopted, the Corps maintained the two principles from RGL 84-04. De
minimis or incidental soil movement occurring during normal dredging
operations is not a discharge of dredged material as defined by the
regulations. The Corps explained that fallback from dredging
operations cannot be avoided, and if fallback from normal dredging
operations was a discharge under § 404, then dredging operations
would be regulable under § 404, a result Congress did not intend.68
631d. (citing U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, RGL 84-04: Application of Sec 404 to
Dredging Projects (Mar. 23, 1984) [hereinafter RGL 84-04]).
64See U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, RGL 84-01: Regulatory Jurisdiction Over
Vegetative Operations (Jan. 10, 1984) [hereinafter RGL 84-01].
65Douglas, supra note 62, at 494.
JId.(citing U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, RGL 85-04: Avoyelles (Mar. 29, 1985)
[hereinafter RGL 85-04].6 7See 51 Fed. Reg. 41206.
6 8See id. at 41210.
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6. Judicial Expansion of Redeposition Doctrine
By 1990, the Corps had concluded that all soil movement
associated with mechanized landclearing activities withinjurisdictional
wetlands were redeposits subject to § 404 requirements. RGL 90-05
formalized this rule and made two important points. First, the Corps
began to consider a comprehensive list of heavy equipment as point
source discharges. Second, the Corps adopted the position that
redeposits incidental to the clearing of a wetland are discharges of
dredged material.69
Finally, the Ninth Circuit came very close to validating the
Corps' ultimate Tulloch Rule position when it permitted the regulation
of a placer mining operation in Rybachek v. EPA.70 In placer mining,
the miner excavates the bottom sediments from a waterway, and after
extracting valuable minerals, redeposits the leftover material into the
stream.7' In Rybachek, the court held that the material is a pollutant
when it is redeposited into the streambed from which it had been
withdrawn because the material had been withdrawn for a distinct
period of time, processed, and disposed. 72 This holding set the stage for
the Supreme Court's decision in Tulloch.
III. NORTH CAROLINA WILDLIFE FEDERA TION
V. TULLOCH
A. Facts
Prior to the TullochRule, regulatory agencies and the courts
believed that dredging activity by itself was not within the reach of
§404 unless the dredging operation caused more than a de minimis
amount of fallback to occur.73 Under this regulatory criterion, a
69See Douglas, supra note 62, at 496-97. On this second point, the Corps apparently
has moved away from its earlier position that land clearing was regulable only if the wetland was
subsequently filled.
70904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).71See id. at 1282.72See Douglas, supra note 62, at 498-99.
73See Craig N. Johnston, 1998 - The Year In Review, 29 ENVTL. L. 69, 84-85 (Spring
1999). Environmental groups point out that while the perimeter ditching and subsequent drainage
does not directly disturb the wetland area, the drainage of the wetland changes its characteristics
in a material manner. The drained area can no longer support the vegetation and species that
characterize wetlands. Therefore, these groups argued that the Corps should regulate this indirect
drainage under the CWA.
1999-2000)
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developer could conceivably drain a wetland area by installing
perimeter drainage ditches.74 Water from the undisturbed wetland area
could drain laterally into the ditches, destroying the CWA jurisdiction
as long as the material removed from the ditches was not placed into a
water of the United States.75
In North Carolina, a developer determined through engineering
analysis that four foot deep drainage ditches, 200 feet apart, would
effectively drain 700 acres of wetlands, located within an 1800-acre site
by lowering the water table in the area. 6 This drainage would then
eliminate the wetland hydrology and vegetation, and in effect remove
the 700 acres from § 404 jurisdiction.77 The developer presented this
plan to the District Corps office and convinced the District that § 404
would not apply.78 The Corp therefore drained the wetland area and
placed the excavated soil upland or in sealed containers.79 During the
excavation process, only de minimis drippings from the excavation
buckets were allowed to fall back into the excavation area.8
In 1990, the North Carolina Wildlife Federation filed a lawsuit
in federal district court against this developer and the Corps to require
enforcement of§ 404 permitting requirements.8 The plaintiffs and the
Corps settled the suit on February 28, 1992 without the direct
participation of the developer. 2 Under the terms of the settlement, the
Corps agreed to change the definition of "discharge of dredged
material" to specifically include incidental fallback83 and "discharges
associated with drainage, excavation, and channelization ....
While the Corps was preparing to initiate the promised rule-
making pursuant to the settlement agreement, the Fifth Circuit further
illustrated the confusion of the rule in Save Our Community v. EPA. 5
In that case, the Fifth Circuit held that drainage of a wetland is not
74See id. at 85.75See id.
76See Douglas, supra note 62 at 480.
"See id. at 499-500.
"See id. at 500.
7See id.
8°See id. at 480, 499-500.
81 See id. at 480.
82See National Mining Ass'n,, 145 F.3d at 1402.
83Sean A. Scoopmire, D.C. District Court Invalidates the Tulloch Rule, 6 S. C. ENVTL.
L. J. 267-68 (1997).84Goldman-Carter, supra note 21, at 91.
85971 F.2d 1155 (5 thCir. 1992).
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regulated if it is accomplished without a discharge, even if the wetland
is drained by pumping.86
B. Addition by Subtraction: The Tulloch Rule
In accordance with the settlement of Tulloch, the Corps
proposed changes to the regulations on June 16, 1992. These changes
closed the loophole exploited by the developer by explicitly bringing
"mechanized landclearing, ditching, channelization and other
excavation activities" under the § 404 permit requirements. 87 This
expansion of jurisdiction was accomplished by first declaring that any
redeposit, including incidental fallback, is a regulable discharge of a
pollutant under § 404.88 Secondy, the Corps removed the excavation of
wetlands from the purview of normal dredging operations.89
As recently as the 1986 rulemaking, the Corps acknowledged
that § 404 jurisdiction did not reach the actual dredging or excavation
process.9" These excavation activities, when they occur within the
waters of the United States, are regulated under the RHA § 10 permit
program.9' However, the RHA jurisdictional reach does not extend to
a major body of the nation's wetlands that are regulated under the CWA
§ 404 non-tidal wetlands program.92
The Tulloch Rule provided a bridge between this regulatory
gap. Prior to the rule, only the discharge of materials excavated from
these non-tidal wetlands came within the reach of the § 404 permit
program.93 So long as the excavation could be performed with only de
minimis fallback, the excavation activity was not regulated. 94 The
Tulloch Rule expanded that jurisdiction to include all excavation of
non-tidal wetlands that resulted in any incidental de minimis fallback.9s
Thus, the jurisdictional gap left by Congress was closed by a regulation
that effectively grafted the RHA regulation of the removal of material
86See Goldman-Carter, supra note 21, at 91-92.
8751 Fed. Reg. at 45008.
88See Johnston, supra note 73, at 85.
89See Douglas, supra note 62, at 482.
9°See 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,232.
91See National Mining Ass 'n, 145 F.3d at 1403.
9See id.
93See Douglas, supra note 62, at 479.
9See id.
95See id. at 480.
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from wetlands onto the § 404 program that governs the addition of
material into jurisdictional waters.96
This exercise of definitional gymnastics required some effort
to accomplish, expanding the definition of "discharge of dredged
material" from 160 words after the 1986 rule-making to 764 words
under the Tulloch Rule in 1992."7 The change was accomplished by
eliminating the de minimis exception for incidental soil movement and
redefining discharge as "any addition.., including any redeposit...
incidental to any activity" including any realistic means of clearing,
drainage or excavation.98 This new definition was in conflict with
previous Corps pronouncements and policy because, prior to Tulloch,
the Corps maintained that Congress did not intend to reach the dredging
and excavation processes with the § 404 program. 99 However, it is
clear that the Tulloch Rule brought these removal activities within the
§ 404 discharge jurisdiction) °
C. Industry Challenges the Tulloch Rule
The Tulloch Rule became final when published on August 25,
1993, and industry groups immediately challenged the validity of the
rule by filing a lawsuit. °1 In taking this action, industry advocates
alleged that the Corps exceeded its statutory authority under § 404
"because Congress never intended for incidental fallback to be within
the statute's jurisdiction."'10 2 In support of this allegation, industry
argued that the statute unambiguously regulates the addition, or
discharge, of a pollutant into the waters of the United States while the
Tulloch Rule regulates the removal of material from the same waters.0 3
In defense of the Tulloch Rule, the Corps argued that the statute
granted it the authority to regulate incidental fallback, something which
had always been done under the Act.'04 The Tulloch Rule simply
closed a loophole created by the Corps' de minimis exception, and the
"See id. at 478, 480-83.
971d. at 480-81.
9"Id. at 481.
99See51 Fed. Reg. at 41210.100See Douglas, supra note 62, at 483.
"01See Mattox, supra note 24, at 608. The lawsuit was filed on August 24, 1993, the
day before the final rule was published in the Federal Register. See id.
' 02 Mank, supra note 51, at 56.
"03See Douglas, supra note 62, at 476.
1°
4
See Mank, supra note 5 1, at 56.
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post Tulloch program better implemented the underlying statutory goals
of protecting wetlands.'0 5 The Corps supported this basic position "on
(1) the Corps' . . . construction of the Act; . . . (2) the legislative
history; ... and (3) prior case law that validated" Tulloch through the
Redeposition Doctrine.
0 6
The first premise of the Corps' argument was that Congress did
not expressly exclude or include incidental fallback within the intended
scope of the § 404.107 Therefore, the second tier of the Chevron"'
analysis required judicial deference to the Corps' interpretation of the
statute."0 9 Even if the Tulloch Rule was not the most likely
interpretation of a broad statutory purpose, the Tulloch Rule was a
permissible interpretation deserving the benefit of the doubt from the
court."0 The Corps pointed out that the "Supreme Court concluded that
Congress" gave the Corps this broad authority because it was required
to protect the "aquatic ecosystem."'
The argument also presupposed that the redeposition of
materials removed from wetlands is a discharge of a pollutant under
§ 404.'12 The Redeposition Doctrine has been applied to materials
excavated from the water and discharged into the same waters after
extracting valuable minerals during placer mining.1 3 The doctrine has
also been used to justify regulation of a tugboat when the boat's
propellers stirred the bottom and seabed materials were redeposited on
an adjacent sea grass bed.1 4  The Corps argued that Tulloch's
expansion of the Redeposition Doctrine to incidental fallback that
occurs during any landclearing operation was justified because these
activities destroy or degrade the wetlands.' "'
The Federal District Court of the District of Columbia
eventually held the Tulloch Rule invalid and issued a national
105See id. at 56-57.
S06 Douglas, supra note 62, at 484-85.
'0 7See id. at 485.
t'OChevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, et al., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
'"9See Mank, supra note 51, at 56.
"°See id. at 67.
"' Moore, supra note 50, at 237.
112See id. at 241.
1 3See Rybachek, 904 F.2d at 1282.
"'See MCC of Florida Inc., 772 F.2d at 1506.
115See 58 Fed. Reg. 45008 at 45015-16.
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injunction against its enforcement." 6 In applying the Chevron analysis,
the court stopped at the first tier, concluding that the statute was clear
and unambiguous in its intent to regulate an addition of pollutants."'
Congress did not intend to regulate the removal of material from the
water just because a small portion of it happens to fall back as the
excavating device is moved through the water." 8  The court
distinguished this incidental fallback from the various applications of
the Redeposition Doctrine on grounds of the duration of the dislocation,
the distance the material is moved from its place of origin, and the
amount of material involved.' 9 First, incidental fallback does not
involve moving the material from one location to another. 20 Second,
§ 404 does not regulate the excavation process.' 2' Finally, for at least
eighteen years, the Corps' application of the statute excluded incidental
fallback from § 404jurisdiction. 22 Congress ratified this interpretation
by not acting to modify or clarify the statute in the face of this
regulatory approach.t2 '
The Corps appealed to the D. C. Circuit and secured a stay of
the district court's nationwide invalidation of Tulloch.'24 However, on
June 19, 1998, a unanimous panel of the circuit affirmed the lower
court's holding and invalidated the Tulloch Rule because it exceeded
the Corps' statutory authority. In reaching this decision, the court made
the following observations:
I. Dredged material of necessity must come from the
water itself, and removal of material is not regulated
under Section § 404 of the CWA.1
25
2 Excavation from water is regulated under the RHA §
10, but that jurisdiction does not reach non-tidal
wetlands. 26
116See Kevin A. Gaynor, Environmental Enforcement Developments - 1998, SD28
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 35,44 (1998).
'See id. at 41.
118See Johnston, supra note 73, at 85-86, 87-88.





122See id.123See id. at 877.
124See Mank, supra note 51, at 69-70.




3. This regulatory gap cannot be eliminated "simply by
declaring that incomplete removal" is an addition. 1
27
4. The Tulloch Rule attempts to regulate "any deposit."
While incidental fallback is a redeposit that exceeds
the statutes reach, other forms of redeposit remain
regulable under § 404.128
The court advised that, since the statute did not establish a bright line
between regulable redeposits and the incidental fallback, the Corps
would be given "considerable deference" to any future attempt to draw
this line. 129 However, the Tulloch Rule did not qualify because the
Corps sought to regulate a wide range of activities that do not "remotely
add anything to the waters of the United States." 1
30
The court characterized the Corps' argument that the district
court misapplied the Chevron Doctrine as a "last-ditch ... defense of the
Tulloch Rule."' 3' The Corps' Chevron argument is that since Congress
did not specifically address whether incidental fallback is a form of
discharge, there is a presumption that Congress delegated the issue to
the Corps. 3 2 Therefore, the Corps urges that the court must pass
beyond the first tier analysis of Chevron. Once the court engages the
second tier of Chevron, it must yield to the Corps' interpretation so
long as that interpretation is permissible. 33 However, the court
concluded that the Tulloch Rule "was an unreasonable construction of
Section 404." '13' This language is not consistent with a first tier
Chevron analysis that reaches the conclusion that the statute is
unambiguous because it speaks to the reasonableness of the
interpre;#tion. Therefore, the court's analysis is confined to the
reasonableness analysis of Chevron's second tier. 35  The Corps'
argument continued that the Tulloch Rule is a permissible interpretation








133See Mank, supra note 5 1, at 66.
134Moore, supra note 50, at 246.
135See id.
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direct environmental impacts. 3 6 Therefore, under the second tier of
Chevron, the court must defer to this interpretation, even if it is not the
most reasonable one, or does not comport with the interpretation
preferred by the court. 137 The Court of Appeals did not agree with these
Chevron based arguments. The question is not whether the Corps has
exercised its discretion lawfully, rather, "[t]he problem with the Tulloch
Rule is that its faithful application would carry the [Corps] beyond its
statutory mandate."'' 38 By attempting to regulate "any redeposit," the
Corps ignored the statutory requirement of an addition. 1
39
IV. REPEAL OF TULLOCH: WHAT NEXT?
Following the D. C. Circuit's decision, the Corps petitioned for
a rehearing, and was denied. 40 The Corps did not appeal to the
Supreme Court, and the Tulloch Rule is now dead. 4' However, the
impact of this decision remains unclear because the ruling is only a
partial deregulation that produces less predictability.
Under Tulloch, it was clear that a § 404 permit was required to
excavate any material from any wetland. However, some
commentators tend to discount the significance of the repeal of the
Tulloch Rule. They point out that it is doubtful that the activities in
North Carolina that gave rise to the Tulloch Rule would escape § 404
jurisdiction today. 42 First, the court limited the deregulation to
incidental fallback. 43 Second, the government remains committed to
preventing unregulated activity in wetlands.'" Finally, the Corps has
indicated its intention to remain aggressive toward landclearing and
excavation of wetlands.
45
Other commentators view this decision as having greater
impact. They point out that the court could have accepted tle efforts
of the Corps on the basis of their superior scientific expertise and
136See Mank, supra note 5 I, at 63.
137See id.
138National Mining Ass'n, 145 F.3d at 1408.
toId.
'"See Johnston, supra note 74, at 88.
14]See id.






advanced the broad objective of eliminating water pollution.14 6
However, according to this perspective, the court elected to hide behind
a narrow interpretation of the statute while calling on the Congress to
close the § 404 loophole.'47 These critics of the decision warn that the
court's refusal to defer to the Corps' interpretation results in significant
costs to society because the regulatory agency is better positioned than
the court to make these decisions. 48 The agency is closer to the polity,
possesses greater scientific knowledge, and can be more flexible and
uniform.
49
In response to the invalidation of the Tulloch Rule, the Corps
has deleted the word "any" as a modifier of "redeposit" from its
definition of "discharge of dredged material," and specifically excludes
"incidental fallback" from its coverage. 50 However, the Corps has
reaffirmed its continued application of the redeposition doctrine to
landclearing, sidecasting, and "subsequent redeposition after mineral
segregation."''
Nonetheless, repeal of the Tulloch Rule reduces "regulatory ...
authority over wetlands, particularly isolated wetlands."5 2  It
significantly reduces the amount of wetlands subject to regulation under
the CWA and establishes a reversal of the recent rising tide of wetlands
inclusion." 3 Many environmentalists are concerned that this decision
may be the beginning of deregulation that could spread to other
environmental protection statutes.'54 They also argue that today a
developer can completely destroy a wetland even though such a
destruction clearly violates the spirit of the CWA.'
55
V. CONCLUSION
Two important issues raised by the D. C. Circuit's repeal of the
Tulloch Rule are whether the Corps exceeded its statutory authority,
and whether the court properly applied the Chevron Doctrine in its
146 See Moore, supra note 50, at 248.
'47See id.
'48See id.
149See Mank, supra note 51, at 68.
15°See Chertok, supra note 20, at 877.
15t Id. at 877-78.
52 Gaynor, supra note 117, at 45.
153See Kinney, supra note 3 1, at 1255.
154See id.
155See Scoopmire, supra note 84, at 270.
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analysis of the case. Both questions should be answered in the
affirmative.
One commentator, for example, concedes that the "court's
ruling is in complete accordance with the statutory language of Section
404" while commending the Rule and encouraging Congress to act to
close the loophole. 56  Actually, the White House called for
congressional action on the day the Tulloch Rule became final. 5 7 In a
statement released at the time of the Rule's announcement, the White
House called on "Congress ... [to] amend the Clean Water Act to make
it consistent with" the Tulloch Rule. 58 If the White House was
convinced that the jurisdictional reach of the Tulloch Rule was within
the authority provided by the CWA, there was no need to call for
congressional action to reconcile the Act to the Rule.
With respect to the court's Chevron analysis, critics argue that
because the statute is ambiguous, the court exceeds its authority by
finding the Act unambiguous. 59 However, this argument fails because
it's premise, e.g., that the statute is ambiguous, is the very question that
the first tier of Chevron calls upon the court to determine.' 6° In making
this independent determination, the court may use traditional statutory
construction, including the statutory language, the structure of the
statute, and the legislative history.' 6' This is precisely what the D. C.
Circuit and the district court did in this case.
The tide of wetland regulatory jurisdiction has covered all
wetlands over the past three decades. This rising tide began with the
Redeposition Doctrine, which provided the first applications of the
"addition by subtraction" concept. 62 However, as this doctrine was
defined over the course of several years, the Corps maintained the
public view that § 404 only regulated discharges of dredged material,





158National Mining Ass'n, 145 F.3d at 1410 (citing WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, Protecting America's Wetlands: A Fair, Flexible, and Effective
Approach 23 (Aug. 24, 1993))159See Mank, supra note 51, at 66.
'6°See id. at 62- 63.
161See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
162 Douglas, supra note 62, at 478.
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regulatory tide established its high water mark by using the incidental
fallback as a pretext to regulate the dredging process.'"
By revoking the Tulloch Rule, the court has rolled back this
rising tide. Whether this roll back checks a single incident of
regulatory overreaching or is the first step of a broader deregulatory
trend remains to be seen. In either case, the rising tide of wetland
regulation has reversed.
164See Johnston, supra note 73, at 87.
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